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THE HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE VIRGINIA
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Virginia Declaratory Judgments Act' ("Act") was passed in
1922 with "a view to making the courts more serviceable to the
people."2 The purpose of the Act "is to afford relief from the un-
certainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal
rights, without requiring one of the parties interested so to in-
vade the rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to main-
tain an ordinary action therefor."3 The Act derives from the equi-
table bill quia timet to which parties resorted when apprehensive
of future damage. While the Virginia courts applied the bill quia
timet in narrow, historically limited contexts, the scope of the Act
was developed through extensive litigation. While the focus of
this litigation was over the meaning of "actual controversy" and
"actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right,"4 the courts, in
their sound discretion, fashioned additional limitations on the
Act's utility.
Section II of this comment defines the principle of quia timet,
traces the historical use of the bill quia timet in Virginia, and
places the Act in perspective. Section III defines the scope of the
Act, concentrating on the application of the "actual controversy"
requirement, the necessity of the "justiciable interest" require-
ment, and the traditional and modern discretionary limitations.
Section IV concludes that the courts are confronted with coun-
terweighing considerations of basic fairness to the parties and ju-
dicial restraint when they determine whether to entertain an ac-
tion for declaratory judgment.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-184 to -191 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
2. Id. § 8.01-191 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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II. HISTORY OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
A. The Principle of Quia Timet
The Declaratory Judgments Act of Virginia is rooted in the eq-
uitable principle of quia timet. The principle was well summa-
rized by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Randolph v. Kinney:
When a person is apprehensive of being subjected to a future incon-
venience, probable, or even possible, to happen, or be occasioned by
the neglect, inadvertence or culpability of another, or where any
property is bequeathed to one after the death of another, and which
the former is desirous of having [it] secured safely for his use; or
where a surety is fearful of injury, from the neglect of his principal to
pay the debt; in all these cases, and others of this kind, the bill quia
timet may be resorted to.5
Thereby, the court defined the equitable principle of quia timet as
a remedy for a person apprehensive of possible or probable future
damage.
In Turpin v. Locket, the court found occasion to apply the prin-
ciple of quia timet to an illustrative set of facts.6 In Turpin, mem-
bers of the Episcopal Church sued to enjoin the defendants, over-
seers of the poor, from selling glebe lands claimed by the church
for the benefit of the poor.7 The Act of 1802 directed the defen-
dants to sell the lands under the theory they were held by the
Church of England, and when that church was disestablished by
the British government after the American Revolution, such
lands revested in the Commonwealth.8 The plaintiffs claimed the
land belonged to the church under laws establishing the Church
of England as an independent church of the Commonwealth and
enabling churches to purchase glebe lands for the use of the min-
isters of the church.9 The plaintiffs also argued that the Act of
5. Randolph v. Kinney, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 394, 397-98 (1825) (alteration in original)
(internal quotations omitted) (holding that the plaintiff could not maintain a bill quia
timet because he was not a "surety; no expectant of a bequest after the death of another;
nor [did he have] any thing to apprehend from the neglect, inadvertence, or culpability of
another").
6. See Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804).
7. Id. at 113-14, 157.
8. See id. at 114-15.
9. See id. at 113-14.
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1802 was an unconstitutional deprivation of their property.'° The
court, in holding for the plaintiffs, found:
[No doubt as to the [court's] jurisdiction. For it is, in substance, a
bill of quia timet, brought to protect a whole society against distur-
bance, under colour of a statute, alleged to be unconstitutional; and
to prevent injury to its property, in consequence of the sales, and the
multiplicity of suits, which would follow from them. 
11
The facts presented a classic case of the use of the bill quia timet:
two parties claiming vested rights in the same property, a dispute
over the validity and constitutionality of a statute, a risk of loss to
the plaintiffs from the imminent actions of the defendants, and
prevention of a number of subsequent suits that would result
through future application of the challenged statute. The specific
requirements for properly sustaining a bill quia timet developed
through application of the bill in certain distinct contexts.
B. Uses of the Bill Quia Timet
1. Use of Bill Quia Timet by Sureties and Creditors
A common use of the bill quia timet was by sureties seeking to
be relieved of liability on a note, bond, or other obligation. It was
well established that a surety, "apprehensive of loss from the ne-
glect of the creditor to enforce his rights against the principal
debtor," could bring suit directly against the principal debtor to
compel him to pay the creditor "to avert the danger" and exoner-
ate the surety from liability.12 A surety's right to bring a bill quia
timet was so well recognized that the denial of such an opportu-
nity by the creditor released the surety from liability. "3 A creditor
10. See id. at 116, 119.
11. Id. at 178 (alteration in original).
12. Wright's Adm'r v. Stockton, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 153, 154-55 (1834); e.g., Norris v.
Crummey, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 323, 334 (1824); see, e.g., Stephenson v. Taverners, 50 Va. (9
Gratt.) 398, 404 (1852) (holding that a surety of a dead principal may file a bill quia timet
against the creditor and the estate of the principal "to make payment of the debt so as to
exonerate himself from his responsibility").
13. See, e.g., Shannon v. McMullin, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 211 (1874). A surety, who has a
right at any time to pay the debt, or by a bill quia timet to compel the principal to pay it, is
released from liability:
[I]f the creditor, without the consent of the surety, make[s] a new contract
with the principal, found on valuable consideration, to postpone the day for
the payment of the debt for a certain period (however short) beyond the day
on which it was to be paid by the terms of the contract on which the surety
2007]
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or surety often used the principle of quia timet to secure by at-
tachment a debt payable at a subsequent day when the obligor
was a nonresident. 4 For example, a surety could use a bill quia
timet against an absconding principle debtor to attach his assets
in the hands of another,"5 or by a partner upon the dissolution of
a partnership to attach the assets of his nonresident partner and
apply them to the debts of the partnership. 16
Jones v. Clark is an example of another interesting use of the
bill quia timet by a surety. 7 In Jones, it was alleged that the ex-
ecutor sold the testator's assets for bonds and subsequently con-
verted the bonds for his own use. 18 It was further alleged that the
purchasers of the bonds knew of the executor's intent to commit
conversion and, therefore, were liable on the bonds for their
fraudulent participation in the crime.19 The court held that the
sureties had a right to file on the bonds a bill quia timet.2 ° Al-
though "they had paid nothing, and nothing had been recovered
against them," the sureties were parties to a separate suit
brought by the beneficiaries of the estate against the executor,
and an adverse judgment was imminent in that suit.2' The court
found that "[i]n this state of danger and apprehended loss" the
sureties had an "unquestionable right" to file a bill quia timet
against the executor and purchasers "to compel them to pay the
amount for which they might be liable ... in ease and exonera-
tion of the sureties. 22
In some instances, a surety's failure to bring a bill quia timet to
protect his or her interest will justify the court finding him or her
liable. In Lacy v. Stamper, the executor of an estate failed to use
reasonable diligence when he did not collect amounts due on
was liable; or if the creditor, without the consent of the surety, release[s] any
lien which he may have on any property of the principal for the security of
the debt.
Id. at 212. The surety will be released from liability "without regard to the extent of dam-
age actually sustained by the surety." Id.
14. See Williamson v. Bowie, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 176, 179 (1818).
15. See id.; Moore v. Holt, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 284, 285 (1853).
16. See M'Kim v. Fulton, 10 Va. (6 Call) 106, 106-07, 112 (1806).
17. Jones v. Clark, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 642 (1875), rev'd, Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704
(1877).
18. Id. at 645.
19. Id.
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bonds owed to the estate.23 The executor did not institute an ac-
tion to collect on the bonds while the obligors were solvent.24 The
executor's successor, upon his qualification, promptly filed suit to
collect on the bonds.25 Suit was delayed, however, because of the
Civil War, and the obligors were no longer solvent by the time
judgment could be obtained. 26 Holding that the beneficiaries of
the estate could proceed against the negligent executor's sureties
before proceeding against the executor, the court noted:
[TIo the extent of any payment they may make in discharge of their
liability ... and even before making such payment, [the sureties] are
entitled, by a proceeding quia timet, to compel [the executor] to ac-
count for and pay any money for which they may be liable, in exon-
eration of the sureties. In fact, so far as parties and subjects primar-
ily liable for the claim are concerned, the sureties have heretofore, in
effect, been coplaintiffs with the legatees [of the estate] in the prose-
cution of this suit .... 27
In Jones, the sureties, who were in a state of "danger and ap-
prehended loss," had an "unquestionable right" to file a bill quia
timet against the negligent executor to compel him to recover the
amounts due on the bonds while the obligors were still solvent, in
exoneration of the sureties.2" Failing to do so, the sureties were
liable on the bonds. It is important to note, however, that the law
was clear that a party's failure to bring a bill quia timet for "pre-
cautionary or preventive remedy" would not exonerate another
from primary liability. 29
A creditor could use a bill quia timet to avoid a multiplicity of
suits. In Smith v. Thompson, the plaintiffs attempted to use a bill
quia timet to short-cut a complicated web of liability on a bond.3°
A simplified account of the facts follow: Mitchell and Thompson
were joint obligors on a bond; Mitchell paid half of the amount
due on the note; Thompson executed to Mitchell an indemnity
bond to secure Thompson's payment of the remainder due on the
original bond; Smith was a surety on the indemnity bond; repre-
23. See Lacy v. Stamper, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 42, 47-49 (1876).
24. Id. at 49.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 60.
28. See Jones, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) at 675 (alteration in original) (decided just a year
earlier).
29. See Brown v. Lambert, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 256, 265 (1880).
30. Smith v. Thompson, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 112 (1850).
2007]
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sentatives of Mitchell's executor, threatened with liability on the
original bond, brought suit against Smith to indemnify them-
selves against any liability.31 The court held that, because
Mitchell's executor was not party to the indemnity bond, the
plaintiffs could proceed "only by treating their suit as a bill quia
timet" for "subrogation by anticipation to the successive remedies
of others."32 In other words, the bill quia timet allowed the plain-
tiffs to proceed directly against Smith on the indemnity bond.33
While the plaintiffs' bill quia timet, which sought an equitable
remedy, was ultimately barred under the defense of laches, this
case still remains a great illustration of the use of the bill quia
timet for "subrogation against those who ought ultimately to be
subjected to the burthen with which [the plaintiffs] are threat-
ened."34
2. Use of a Bill Quia Timet to Remove Cloud on Title
While the legal scope of the principle of quia timet and sureties
was well settled in Virginia, the applicability of the principle to
resolving title issues was not. In an 1877 case, Carroll v. Brown,
the court quoted Judge Story:
It is obvious that the jurisdiction, exercised in cases of this sort, is
founded upon the administration of a protective or preventive justice.
The party is relieved upon the principle, as it is technically called,
quia timet; that is, for fear that such agreements, securities, deeds,
or other instruments, may be vexatiously or injuriously used against
him, when the evidence to impeach them may be lost; or that they
may now throw a cloud or suspicion over his title or interest. 
35
Stearns v. Harmon was the perfect case for the court to apply the
principle of quia timet to a dispute over title to land. In Stearns,
"the owner was in possession, and could not bring ejectment
against the adverse claimant, not in possession, to try the ques-
tion of title."36 In an effort to circumvent the plaintiffs remedy at
law, "the adverse claimant standing off' was "content not to bring
his action then against the owner .. thus showing that he was
31. Id. at 112-14.
32. Id. at 117 (alteration in original).
33. Id. at 117-18.
34. Id.
35. Carroll v. Brown, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 791, 795 (1877) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 694 (F.V. Balch ed., 11th ed. 1873)).
36. Stearns v. Harmon, 80 Va. 48, 57 (1885).
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holding back for some sinister purpose, the tendency of which was
to seriously impair if not destroy the market value of the owner's
title."37 In subsequent decisions, the court interpreted Stearns
narrowly, holding that a plaintiff could rely on a bill quia timet to
quiet title to land only when the plaintiff was in possession of the
land in dispute; and thus, could not maintain an action at law for
ejectment.3" The court, however, did not make a distinction based
on the motives of the parties or on whether the dispute was a re-
sult of fraud or mistake.39
The White Act provided that whenever the court had jurisdic-
tion to remove clouds from title to real estate by bill quia timet
because the party was in possession, the court would have juris-
diction when the party was not in possession.4 ° In Payne v. Buena
Vista Extract Co., the court held that subsequent to the passage
of the White Act, the decision of whether the court had jurisdic-
tion to hear a suit to quiet title remained "undoubtedly in the
sound discretion of such courts, when the reality of the appre-
hended danger of injury from the alleged cloud upon the title is in
question, as aforesaid, but not otherwise."41 When two parties to
the bill quia timet both claimed legal title to the same tract of
land under separate deeds, and a third party exercised acts of
ownership under color of title, there was "no doubt upon the point
of the reality of such apprehended danger."42
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id.; Austin v. Minor, 107 Va. 101, 104, 57 S.E. 609, 610 (1907). The bill
quia timet was perfect for an adverse possessor seeking to remove any cloud from title to
the land he possessed. See Austin, 107 Va. at 104, 57 S.E. at 610. In Kane v. Va. Coal &
Iron Co., 97 Va. 329, 331, 33 S.E. 627, 628 (1899), the court held:
Whether or not the jurisdiction will be exercised, depends upon the fact that
the estate or interest to be protected is equitable in its nature, or that the
remedies at law are inadequate where the estate or interest is legal-a party
being left to his legal remedy where his estate or interest is legal in its na-
ture, and full and complete justice can thereby be done.
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting IV JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1399 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 1994)).
39. Stearns, 80 Va. at 57.
40. See Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va. 296, 306-08, 98 S.E. 34, 37-38
(1919). Prior to passage of the White Act, one could not remove cloud from title without
legal title and actual possession. Id. at 307, 98 S.E. at 38.
41. Id. at 308, 98 S.E. at 38.
42. Id.
20071
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III. SCOPE OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
A. Early Applications of the Declaratory Judgments Act
The Act was passed in 1922. 4' The first attempts to apply the
Act were efforts to cure procedural deficiencies so that a decision
on the merits could be obtained. In Schmelz Bros., Bankers, Inc.
v. Quinn, a deed of trust provided for a commission of five percent
to the trustee following the sale of the real estate.4 4 Under the cir-
cumstances of the case, however, "[t]he court undertook by ] de-
cree to administer the trust created by the deed."4 The trustees
appealed an order of the trial court fixing their commission at the
rate prescribed for judicial sales. 46 The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a ruling on the issue was "possibly warranted" by the
Act because the issue was "said to be a question upon which the
trial courts are not in harmony, and counsel on both sides have
asked the ruling of this court on the subject."47 The court enter-
tained the appeal despite finding that the trial court's ruling was
in favor of the appellant, and "it ha[d] no just ground of com-
plaint."48 In Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Epling, the trial court granted
the defendant's demurrer based on a lack of jurisdiction; but on
appeal, both parties requested that the court "proceed to a con-
sideration of the case upon its merits as if no demurrer had been
filed."49 Without explanation, the court decided the question on
the merits, "feeling warranted in so doing" in light of the Act."°
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 2007) provides that:
In cases of actual controversy, circuit courts within the scope of their respec-
tive jurisdictions shall have power to make binding adjudications of right,
whether or not consequential relief is, or at the time could be, claimed and no
action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a judgment
order or decree merely declaratory of right is prayed for. Controversies in-
volving the interpretation of deeds, wills, and other instruments of writing,
statutes, municipal ordinances and other governmental regulations, may be
so determined, and this enumeration does not exclude other instances of ac-
tual antagonistic assertion and denial of right.
Id.
44. Schmelz Bros., Bankers, Inc. v. Quinn, 134 Va. 78, 96, 113 S.E. 845, 850 (1922).
45. Id., 113 S.E. at 851.
46. See id. at 97, 113 S.E. at 851.
47. Id. at 96, 113 S.E. at 851.
48. Id.
49. Craig-Giles Iron Co. v. Epling, 135 Va. 74, 77, 115 S.E. 534, 535 (1922).
50. Id. at 78, 115 S.E. at 535.
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In another early case, Mullins v. Morgan, the court rebutted
the defendants' argument that they were prejudiced by the plain-
tiffs' delay in bringing a lawsuit because the defendants could
have asserted their rights under the Act."' The court opined that
subsequent to the passage of the Act, "it is as much incumbent
upon an alleged wrongdoer to assert his rights in a court of law as
it is incumbent upon one whose alleged rights are being violated
to assert them in a court of equity." 2 Furthermore, "[aifter
knowledge that a controversy has arisen, the duties of the respec-
tive parties are reciprocal." 3
B. The Requirement of Actual Controversy
The court formally upheld the constitutionality of the Act in
Patterson v. Patterson.4 In Patterson, the plaintiffs purchased
land from executors who, under the terms of the will, had no right
to sell the land.55 The defendants were the infant heirs of the de-
visee who assented to the sale. "Construing the act liberally,"
the court held that the purchasers could "avail themselves of the
statute and have their rights adjudicated" before "such time as
the infant defendants might see fit to sue to recover possession" of
the land.57 The court noted that the plaintiffs' bill and the infant
defendants' cross-bill were, in effect, bills quia timet, but jurisdic-
tion "was clearly conferred" upon the courts by the Act whether or
not the principle of quia timet conferred jurisdiction.5"
The court could "find nothing in the statute which contravenes
any of the provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions."59 The
effect of the Act was merely "to increase the usefulness of the
courts and remove doubt and uncertainty as to the final result of
legal controversies, by empowering the courts to enter declaratory
judgments and decrees touching the rights of the parties in such
cases."6" In upholding the Act's constitutionality, the court noted
that England, Australia, and Canada enacted similar statutes
51. Mullins v. Morgan, 176 Va. 201, 211, 10 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1940).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Patterson v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 118, 131 S.E. 217, 218 (1926).
55. Id. at 115-16, 131 S.E. at 218.
56. Id. at 115, 131 S.E. at 217-18.
57. Id. at 122, 131 S.E. at 219-20.
58. Id. at 118, 131 S.E. at 218.
59. Id. at 119, 131 S.E. at 219.
60. Id. at 119-20, 131 S.E. at 219.
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and that "[tihe constitutionality of these statutes has been con-
sidered by the courts of several states, and sustained in each in-
stance, except in Michigan."6 The court distinguished the Michi-
gan statute because "it authorize[d] the courts to make binding
declarations of Aights where no judicial controversy [was] in-
volved" and therefore required "the performance of nonjudicial
acts, in violation of the clause of the Constitution which vests ju-
dicial power in the courts."62 The key distinction between the un-
constitutional Michigan statute and constitutional Virginia stat-
ue was the Michigan statute "did not limit the operation of the
statute to cases of actual controversy and actual antagonistic as-
sertion and denial of right."63 Patterson suggests that the Virginia
statute's express requirements of actual controversy and actual
antagonistic assertion and denial of right are constitutional limi-
tations on the scope of the Act. 64
The court, in Patterson, expounded upon the constitutional re-
quirement of actual controversy with the following language:
The act contemplates that the parties to the proceeding shall be ad-
versely interested in the matter as to which the declaratory judg-
ment is sought and their relation thereto such that a judgment or
decree will operate as res adjudicata as to them. It authorizes the
entry of such judgment before the right is violated, and even though
no consequential relief is or could be asked for or granted. It does
not, however, confer upon the courts the power to render judicial de-
cisions which are advisory only. 65
The court found that the facts in Patterson met the actual con-
troversy constitutional requirement because:
The bill avers that the purchasers of the lots have a right to retain
them in their possession and have their titles to them confirmed,
while the cross-bill of the infant defendants asserts that the pur-
chasers have no right to the lots and that these defendants' owner-
ship of an undivided one-half interest in them should be established
by the court. 66
In Chick v. MacBain, the court reaffirmed that the actual con-
troversy requirement is the central issue in the court's determi-
61. Id. at 120, 131 S.E. at 219.
62. Id. at 121, 131 S.E. at 219.
63. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 120, 131 S.E. at 219.
66. Id. at 119, 131 S.E. at 219.
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nation of whether a case may be properly adjudicated in a de-
claratory judgment action. s7 In Chick, the plaintiff's predecessor
leased a storehouse to the defendants for a period of five years at
a fixed rate for the first thirty months and at a higher fixed rate
for the remaining thirty months.68 The lease provided that either
party could terminate the lease at the end of the five-year period
by written notice to the other party; but that otherwise the lease
would continue "upon the same terms and conditions as herein
contained for another period of five years."69 When no such notice
was given, the plaintiff brought suit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the defendants should pay the higher rate for the en-
tire second period of five years according to the terms of the
lease.7" The defendants contended that they should pay the lower
rate for the first thirty months and the higher rate for the second
thirty months, just as they had done in the prior five-year pe-
riod.7" The court held that it had jurisdiction under the Act to ad-
judicate the dispute despite an available and complete remedy at
law:
The test of the applicability of the statute is the determination of
the existence of an actual controversy. The manifest intention of the
legislature . . . was to provide for a speedy determination of actual
controversies between citizens, and to prune, as far as is consonant
with right and justice, the dead wood attached to the common law
rule of "injury before action" and a multitude of suits to establish a
single right.
The fact that a plaintiff or complainant might, by the institution
of an action or suit or series of actions or suits, eventually, through
protracted and continuous litigation, have determined the same
questions that may be determined once and for all in a declaratory
judgment proceeding, has never, so far as we find, been held by the
67. Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60, 66-67, 160 S.E. 214, 216 (1931). While the focus of
the court's inquiry is whether there is an actual controversy, a finding of actual contro-
versy does not end the inquiry, and a demurrer to a motion or petition for declaratory
judgment will be sustained when the motion or petition otherwise fails to show a right to
relief. See County of Chesterfield v. Town & Country Apartments & Townhouses, 214 Va.
587, 588, 203 S.E.2d 117, 118 (1974) (holding that a declaratory judgment was not proper
despite the existence of an actual controversy where the petition failed to allege compli-
ance with a statute requiring any demand on the county be first submitted to the board of
supervisors); First Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank v. Raphael, 201 Va. 718, 723, 113 S.E.2d 683,
688 (1960) (dismissing the petition for declaratory judgment despite the existence of an
actual controversy where the court determined, on the merits, that the petition did not
state a case entitling the plaintiff to the relief sought). Cf infra section III.D.1.
68. Chick, 157 Va. at 63-64, 160 S.E. at 215.
69. Id. at 64, 160 S.E. at 215.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 64-65, 160 S.E. at 215.
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courts to deprive the court of jurisdiction to enter a declaratory
judgment wherein the entire rights of the parties can be determined
and settled once and for all. 72
The above language is dicta; there is no reason to believe that
the case did not present an actual controversy or that a declara-
tory judgment would prevent a "multitude of suits." The test of
applicability, however, was subsequently used often to test the
scope of the Act.
The actual controversy requirement can be defined only
through an analysis of the courts' determinations of whether a
particular set of facts meet the requirement."3 In D.D. Jones
Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Commonwealth, the court was con-
fronted with a set of contentions that did not constitute an actual
controversy.74 In that case, a public service corporation applied
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, which would
authorize it to act as a common carrier of property by motor vehi-
cle between certain cities.75 The court held that the State Corpo-
ration Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to render
a declaratory judgment construing the statute authorizing the
granting of such certificates and found that the "petitioner was
unwilling to introduce evidence for fear that the evidence, if pro-
duced, might show that it had no case under any possible con-
struction of the statute."76 In other words, the public service cor-
poration failed to allege facts establishing an actual controversy.
Attempting to illustrate the notion of actual controversy, the
court opined:
It was not intended that the statute should be invoked in every case
where a controversy was possible. One contemplating a future di-
vorce should not be permitted to invoke it to ascertain what corrobo-
72. Id. at 66-67, 160 S.E. at 216.
73. See, e.g., Hagan v. Dungannon Lumber Co., 145 Va. 568, 134 S.E. 570 (1926)
(holding that plaintiff failed to allege an actual controversy when the bill simply alleged
that the plaintiff owned a large amount of valuable property, was largely indebted to de-
fendant creditors, and was unwilling or incompetent to manage its own business); Tony
Guiffre Distrib. Co. v. Va. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 5 Va. Cir. 243 (Cir. Ct.
1985) (Alexandria City) (holding that the petition seeking a declaration that a statute did
not prohibit wholesalers of alcoholic beverages from providing routine business entertain-
ment to retail licensees concerned an actual controversy, where the Commission stated its
position that such entertainment was prohibited).
74. D.D. Jones Transfer & Warehouse Co. v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 184, 5 S.E.2d
628 (1939); see also Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 105, 500 S.E.2d 503, 507
(1998) (holding that a declaratory judgment action could not be maintained in a cross-bill
because the actual controversy involved a non-party and not the cross-bill defendant).
75. D.D. Jones Transfer & Warehouse Co., 174 Va. at 186-87, 5 S.E.2d at 628.
76. Id. at 192, 5 S.E.2d at 631.
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ration of his evidence was necessary. That question would be inci-
dental to and should be decided in due course when the cause came
on to be heard, just as unnumbered statutes must be construed in
orderly procedure in unnumbered cases. 77
The court was unwilling to construe the statute when the con-
troversy between the parties, as to its interpretation, was not ac-
tual but only possible. The court would not determine an issue
that may be in controversy between the parties without adjudi-
cating the whole controversy.
In Lynchburg Traffic Bureau v. Norfolk & Western Railway,
the court similarly did not find an actual controversy sufficient to
invoke the court's jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment.78
The Lynchburg Traffic Bureau petitioned the State Corporation
Commission to enter a judgment declaring the legal rate on bulk
ground limestone moving in carload lots between two Virginia cit-
ies. 79 The petition for declaratory judgment did "not further iden-
tify the petitioner or indicate what its interest is in the question,
or in what way or on what ground it has a right to institute or
maintain the petition."0 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the petition was subject to dismissal for failure to
present an actual controversy."1
Fairfax County Park Authority v. Brundage provides a good ex-
ample of facts satisfying the requirement of actual controversy. 2
The dispute was between the Park Authority and the Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation over valuable property devised to
the Park Authority. 3 The property was devised in fee simple
upon the condition that the property be used exclusively as a na-
ture preserve and alternatively to the Research Foundation if any
public authority took part of the property for any inconsistent
use.8 4 After the testator's death, the executor of the estate en-
tered into an agreement with the Park Authority setting forth the
conditions of the will. 5 The agreement provided that no road
77. Id. at 194, 5 S.E.2d at 632.





82. Fairfax County Park Auth. v. Brundage, 208 Va. 622, 159 S.E.2d 831 (1968).
83. Id. at 622-23, 159 S.E.2d at 832.
84. Id. at 623, 159 S.E.2d at 832.
85. Id.
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would be constructed on the property other than the State High-
way Commissioner's proposed widening of Kirby Road, which
runs along the northern boundary of the property. 6 The Park Au-
thority sought a judgment declaring that the agreement with the
executor was in compliance with the will, and the Research
Foundation sought a declaration that the proposed uses of the
property would violate the conditions in the will. 7 The court held
that the action for a declaratory judgment presented an actual
controversy and was "an issue that was ripe for decision even
though the proposed taking had not been effected." 8
Blodinger v. Broker's Title, Inc. further tested the outer bounds
of the scope of the Act.8 9 In that case, a group of attorneys
brought suit against a title insurance company seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the defendant was engaged in the unauthor-
ized practice of law.9° The company asserted that no actual con-
troversy existed between the parties and argued that while there
was a disagreement as to whether it was engaged in the unau-
thorized practice of law, "no rights or obligations of the attorneys
have been infringed entitling them to a declaration of this fact."
91
The court, however, found that the attorneys had a "vested inter-
est" in the determination because "tihey feared participation in
closings with Broker's Title would subject them to possible disci-
plinary action."92 Yet, "they worried, as has turned out to be the
case, their continued refusal to deal with the company would lead
to possible antitrust liability."93 Therefore, "[t]he attorneys were
not seeking an answer to a hypothetical question" but sought
resolution of an actual controversy-"a determination of the legal-
ity of the company's activities [that] was essential if the attorneys
were to avoid the possibility of both disciplinary action and a law
suit."94
The determination of whether the complaint, petition, or mo-
tion for declaratory judgment alleges an actual controversy is a
preliminary inquiry, separate and distinct from the court's deci-
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 623 n.2, 159 S.E.2d at 832 n.2.
89. Blodinger v. Broker's Title, Inc., 224 Va. 201, 294 S.E.2d 876 (1982).
90. Id. at 203, 294 S.E.2d at 877.
91. Id. at 203-04, 294 S.E.2d at 877.
92. Id. at 204, 294 S.E.2d at 877.
93. Id.
94. Id., 294 S.E.2d at 877-78.
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sion on the merits. In Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, the
Supreme Court of Virginia set forth the semantics of a determi-
nation of actual controversy.95 The plaintiffs alleged that as part
of their mining operations they held mining rights consisting of
privileges and easements in certain land conveyed by deed, also
claiming that the defendants were developing on the surface of a
portion of that land.96 Plaintiffs alleged that it was necessary for
their mining operation to have exclusive use of the surface of the
land and sought a declaration of the extent of their rights under
the deed.97 The court held that the bill presented an actual con-
troversy because it alleged a denial of implied and express rights
granted in the deed.9" The court elaborated on the procedure for
determining whether the plaintiffs alleged facts sufficient to
maintain an action for declaratory judgment:
We are here concerned with the right to the interpretation, rather
than the interpretation of the deed. The test of the right to an inter-
pretation is the existence of an "actual controversy[.]" The interpreta-
tion is the solution of the controversy. It follows as the result of the
controversy. Whether or not there is a controversy is a question of
fact, and may be shown by the pleadings or by the evidence.
99
Yukon illustrates the sound rationale behind the two-step de-
claratory judgment adjudication; the finding of an actual contro-
versy must remain separate and distinct from a decision on the
merits. 00
C. The Justiciable Interest Requirement
The court has often held that a plaintiff must have a justiciable
interest in the subject matter of the litigation. While the court of-
95. Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 175 Va. 366, 8 S.E.2d 303 (1940).
96. Id. at 369-71, 8 S.E.2d at 305.
97. Id. at 371-72, 8 S.E.2d at 305-06.
98. Id. at 372, 8 S.E.2d at 306.
99. Id. at 368, 8 S.E.2d at 304.
100. See also Portsmouth Rest. Ass'n v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Alliance, 183 Va. 757,
763, 33 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1945) (upholding the Yukon two-step procedure and holding that
"[tihe fact that the contract between the parties expired . . . may affect the merits of the
controversy, but does not lessen the alleged fact of an existing controversy"); Graves v.
Ciraden, Inc., 65 Va. Cir. 127, 129 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Fairfax County) (quoting Yukon and
holding that the complaint alleged an actual controversy and finding that the defendant's
arguments, that there was no controversy between the parties because neither party
breached the agreements at issue and neither party asserted or denied a specific right,
were arguments to the merits).
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ten presents the requirement as distinct from the requirement of
actual controversy, it generally does not analyze the require-
ments separately. In Lynchburg Traffic Bureau, after identifying
the Act's test of applicability as the "determination of the exis-
tence of an actual controversy," the court continued: "Moreover, it
is well settled that 'in order to entitle any person to maintain an
action in court it must be shown that he has a justiciable interest
in the subject matter in litigation; either in his own right or in a
representative capacity.'"'1 ' The plaintiffs petition for a declara-
tory judgment, however, was subject to dismissal for lack of a jus-
ticiable interest on the same grounds it was subject to dismissal
for lack of an actual controversy; the petition did not indicate the
plaintiffs interest or on what ground it had a right to maintain
the petition.'02
Even when the court correctly determines that a plaintiff lacks
a justiciable interest, making a declaratory judgment action im-
proper, analysis of the requirement as a separate entity is unnec-
essary. In City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, the court opined that "[t]he
controversy must be one that is justiciable, that is, where specific
adverse claims, based upon present rather than future or specu-
lative facts, are ripe for judicial adjustment." 10 3 The plaintiff
sought a judgment to declare invalid a city zoning ordinance,
which conferred authority on the board of zoning appeals to issue
special use permits for construction of apartments in the city.104
The plaintiff stipulated that "[n]o specific case regarding apart-
ment usage within the city is involved in this cause."'0 ' The plain-
tiff was merely a resident and taxpayer of the city.0 6 The court
found that the plaintiffs case was "a wholesale, broadside assault
upon the city's zoning ordinance, bereft of a single real complaint
of injury, or threatened injury."0 7 The plaintiff was left to depend
"upon future or speculative facts, that is to say, that a special use
permit might, someday, be granted by the board which might ag-
grieve the plaintiff."' 8 Therefore, "the motion for declaratory
101. Lynchburg Traffic Bureau v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 207 Va. 107, 108, 147 S.E.2d
744, 745 (1966).
102. Id.
103. City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1964).
104. Id. at 228-29, 135 S.E.2d at 775.
105. Id. at 230, 135 S.E.2d at 776.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 231, 135 S.E.2d at 776.
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judgment, upon its face, merely sought an advisory opinion, or a
decision upon a moot question, or an answer to a speculative in-
quiry." °9 In other words, the plaintiff failed to allege an actual
controversy.
Determining, as a separate requirement, whether the plaintiff
has a justiciable interest in the litigation may only lead to confu-
sion. In Brinkley v. Blevins, the court couched the requirement of
justiciable interest in terms of whether the plaintiff had a "real
interest in the subject matter in controversy.""' In Brinkley, the
petitioning creditors sought a judgment declaring a deed from the
defendant debtor to his wife void on the grounds "that the deed
was voluntary and made with the intent to defraud and defeat
them in the collection of their debts.""' The same creditors previ-
ously sued the defendant debtor and his wife to set aside the deed
on the very same grounds, and judgment was entered against the
creditors "on the merits." 1 2 Rather than dismissing the declara-
tory judgment action on the obvious basis of res adjudicata, the
court held that the creditors did not state a case for a declaratory
judgment because the creditors "not only fail to allege and prove
that they have an interest in the subject matter of the litigation,
but the record conclusively shows that they have no interest
whatever."113 The court determined that the general creditors had
no interest because the statute provided that an unrecorded deed
was void only to lien creditors." 4 Therefore, the creditors could
not maintain a declaratory judgment "even though the court
should declare the deed void."" 5
The court in Blevins confused the issue by deciding the case on
the merits and then retroactively holding that the plaintiffs did
109. Id.; see also Garnett v. Medicorp Props., Inc., 62 Va. Cir. 450, 451 (Cir. Ct. 2003)
(Spotsylvania County) (holding that the plaintiff could not seek a declaratory judgment
determining a reasonable time for the completion of a contract because such an adjudica-
tion would be based on "speculative future circumstances" that may occur during the con-
tract performance) (citing City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229-30, 135 S.E.2d
773, 775-76 (1964)); FSG Capital Corp. v. Bristol Assocs., 22 Va. Cir. 231, 231-32 (Cir. Ct.
1990) (Fairfax County) (holding that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate because
the plaintiff sought an advisory opinion that a note represented a binding obligation on
the defendant when there was already an actual anticipatory breach).
110. Brinkley v. Blevins, 157 Va. 41, 45, 160 S.E. 23, 24 (1931).
111. Id. at 43, 160 S.E. at 23.
112. Id. at 42, 44, 160 S.E. at 23-24.
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not have an interest sufficient to entitle them to a declaratory ac-
tion. The creditors clearly had a property right in the indebted-
ness of the defendant. The creditors presented an actual contro-
versy by alleging that the defendant's fraudulent conveyance
injured that interest. '16 Therefore, it was not that the plaintiffs
lacked an interest sufficient to maintain a suit for declaratory
judgment, it was, rather, that they could not ultimately prevail
on the merits under the court's interpretation of the statute. The
court's holding is even more puzzling in light of the fact that it
could have dismissed the action on the grounds of res adjudi-
cata."17 The determination of whether the plaintiff has an interest
in the subject matter of the litigation is better left as part, al-
though an important part, of the preliminary determination of
whether he has alleged an actual controversy."'
Despite the fact that the justiciable interest requirement adds
little to the analysis, the requirement continues to be applied in
zoning and other land use cases. "9 In Board of Supervisors v.
Southland Corp., the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring inva-
lid a zoning ordinance that required a special exception from the
board of supervisors to operate a "quick-service food store."120 The
plaintiff was in the business of obtaining suitable sites and devel-
116. Id. at 43, 160 S.E. at 23.
117. See id. at 45, 160 S.E. at 24.
118. Brinkley is not the only case where the defendant's argument on the merits of the
case was disguised as an argument that the plaintiff lacked a justiciable interest sufficient
for declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Basheer/Edgemoore-Millwood, LLC v. Sizdahkhani, 62
Va. Cir. 28, 29 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Fairfax County) (holding that the plaintiffs had a justiciable
interest in the controversy in the face of defendant's argument that plaintiff lacked such
an interest "because the portion of the easement that Plaintiff [sought] to have vacated
[could] only be extinguished by Fairfax County, the property owner under the deed of sub-
division."). The problem in Brinkley also occurs in the application of the actual controversy
test. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
119. See Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. Mill Two Assocs. P'ship, 259 Va. 685, 693-94, 529
S.E.2d 318, 323-24 (2000) (holding that a declaratory judgment action could be main-
tained by a conveyor of property with restrictive .covenants against the conveyee when the
conveyee had not received final approval for development, but took substantial steps in
making specific plans); Bd. of Supervisors v. Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 222 Va. 218, 224, 278
S.E.2d 859, 862 (1981) (holding that a developer had a justiciable interest in bringing a
declaratory judgment action when he owned a contractual right to purchase the subject
property and filed a development plan for the community); Broad Run Vill., L.C. v. Lou-
doun County Bd. of Supervisors, 59 Va. Cir. 96, 97 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Loudoun County) (hold-
ing that the plaintiffs met the justiciable interest requirement necessary for declaratory
relief when plaintiffs alleged they owned property subject to unreasonable, arbitrary, and
capricious restrictions on its development).
120. Bd. of Supervisors v. Southland Corp., 224 Va. 514, 518, 297 S.E.2d 718, 719-20
(1982).
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oping them as 7-Eleven stores, and, therefore, had an "actual,
present right to construct and operate quick-service food stores"
in the county.12' The court distinguished Shanklin on the basis
that the plaintiff in the present case had "a justiciable interest in
the subject matter which was ripe for judicial determination,
rather than one which was merely hypothetical or abstract."
1 22
The justiciable interest test is prominent in land use cases be-
cause the issue of whether an actual controversy is alleged turns
on the nature and extent of the plaintiffs' interest in the land sub-
ject to state regulation.
D. The Traditional Discretionary Limitations
1. Whether There is an Adequate Remedy at Law
In American National Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner,
the court opined that to maintain a suit for declaratory judgment,
"[s]omething more than an actual controversy is necessary. In
common cases where a right has matured or a wrong has been
suffered, customary processes of the court, where they are ample
and adequate, should be adopted."'23 The court has the ability to
dismiss on these grounds because "[w]hether or not jurisdiction
121. Id. at 520, 297 S.E.2d at 721.
122. Id. at 520-21, 297 S.E.2d at 721 (internal quotations omitted); see also Logie v.
Town of Front Royal, 58 Va. Cir. 527, 531-32 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Warren County) (holding that
plaintiff landlords had a justiciable interest in seeking a declaration that a statute was
invalid although plaintiff was not "directly and immediately affected" by the statute, but
was engaged in the rental of property in the county generally).
123. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Danville v. Kushner, 162 Va. 378, 386, 174 S.E.
777, 780 (1934) (internal quotations omitted); see also Berry v. Hartford Cas. Co., 5 Va.
Cir. 481, 482 (Cir. Ct. 1977) (Richmond City) (holding that declaratory judgment was im-
proper where plaintiff motorist asked the court for advice regarding the best order to sue
various insurance companies and opining that an "adequate remedy at law does not neces-
sarily mean a perfect remedy"); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
13 Va. Cir. 421, 423 (Cir. Ct. 1969) (Richmond City) (holding that a declaratory judgment
was inappropriate "where a multiple choice of remedies is available and where there is a
complete and adequate remedy at law"). Additionally, coercive or injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment can be determined in one action. Winborne v. Doyle, 190 Va. 867,
871-72, 59 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1950); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-186 (Repl. Vol. 2000 &
Cum. Supp. 2006) ("Further relief based on a declaratory judgment order or decree may
be granted whenever necessary or proper."); Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 239, 72 S.E.2d
506, 518 (1952) ("In a proper case under [the Declaratory Judgments Act], such conse-
quential, other, and additional relief as is justified by the pleadings, and by the private or
public rights and interest involved, may be awarded."). Clearly, the court may determine
the rights of the parties in a declaratory judgment action and then enforce those rights in
a subsequent action. Doyle, 190 Va. at 872-73, 59 S.E.2d at 93.
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shall be taken is within the sound discretion of the trial court." '124
While the court's language appears to be dicta, it has formed the
foundation of a major basis for dismissal of a declaratory judg-
ment suit.'25 In Fairfield Development Corp. v. City of Virginia
Beach, the plaintiffs filed petitions for declaratory judgment to
recover fees paid "as a condition precedent to the recording of a
final subdivision plat."'26 The fees were paid pursuant to an ordi-
nance that the plaintiffs alleged was unconstitutional and inva-
lid.'27 Holding that the plaintiffs' "remedy was by motion for
judgment and not by petition for declaratory judgment," the court
found that "[i]n essence [the plaintiffs] were seeking a money
judgment for a sum certain."2 ' Because "[t]he court had nothing
to determine that would guide the parties in their future conduct
in relation to each other," the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy
at law. 129
In Hop-In Food Stores, Inc. v. Serv-N-Save, Inc., the court held
that the plaintiff was without an adequate remedy at law.13 ° In
Hop-In Food Stores, the plaintiff, the new lessee and current oc-
cupant of certain premises, brought suit for declaratory judgment
against a former lessee to determine which party had the right to
occupy the premises. 3' The lessor notified the lessee that his
124. Kushner, 162 Va. at 386, 174 S.E. at 780.
125. Earlier, the Court addressed a challenge to a declaratory judgment action based
on the existence of an adequate remedy at law in Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60, 66-67,
160 S.E. 214, 216 (1931). See supra text accompanying note 72.
126. Fairfield Dev. Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach, 211 Va. 715, 715-16, 180 S.E.2d
533, 533-34 (1971).
127. Id. at 716, 180 S.E.2d at 534.
128. Id. at 717, 180 S.E.2d at 534-35.
129. Id., 180 S.E.2d at 535; see also Andrews v. Universal Moulded Prods. Corp., 189
Va. 527, 529-30, 53 S.E.2d 837, 838 (1949) (determining that the matter could be decided
in a contempt proceeding and that the declaratory judgment proceeding "served no further
purpose and was properly dismissed"); Kontzias v. CVS, Inc., 44 Va. Cir. 161, 162-63 (Cir.
Ct. 1997) (Fairfax County) (holding that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for de-
claratory judgment because the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law; the plaintiff
could sue for breach of contract and seek specific performance or monetary damages).
130. Hop-In Food Stores, Inc. v. Serv-N-Save, Inc., 237 Va. 206, 210, 375 S.E.2d 753,
756 (1989); see also Bd. of Supervisors v. Garrett, 1 Va. Cir. 379, 380-81 (Cir. Ct. 1983)
(Richmond City) (dismissing action for declaratory judgment that the Commonwealth was
responsible for direct payment of attorney fees or liable for reimbursement of fees when
plaintiff had a prior opportunity to assert its rights to direct payment and an adequate
remedy at law for the recovery of a sum certain); Kassir v. City of Norfolk, 16 Va. Cir. 485,
488 (Cir. Ct. 1980) (Norfolk City) (holding that the plaintiffs' claim of possible property
damage from the state's widening of a street adjacent to their property were without a
remedy at law, but could assert their rights in the form of a declaratory judgment).
131. Hop-In Food Stores, 237 Va. at 208, 375 S.E.2d at 754-55.
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lease was terminated and removed the lessee's equipment from
the premises; the new lessee then installed its own equipment.
132
The former lessee threatened to prosecute the current lessee's
employees and customers for criminal trespass, but filed an ac-
tion for common-law trespass only against the lessor. 13 3 Mean-
while, the new lessee was subject to "potential liability for con-
tinuing damages" and could not be "compelled simply to wait
until [the former lessee] decided to prosecute its employees and
customers for trespass." '34 The new lessee could not assert the
possessory remedies at law (unlawful detainer, ejectment, and
trespass) against the former lessee who already lost possession of
the premises. 135 The court held that the new lessee, who was not
a party to the trespass suit, was without an adequate remedy at
law and, therefore, could maintain an action for declaratory
judgment against the former lessee.13 The requirement that the
plaintiff be without an adequate remedy at law evolved into the
modern test of whether rights have accrued and matured and
wrongs have been suffered.
2. Whether Administrative Remedies are Exhausted
In a series of land use cases, the court scrutinized the require-
ment that the plaintiff must exhaust any available administra-
tive remedy in order to maintain a declaratory judgment action.
In Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, the plaintiff landowners chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that rezoned
the subject property. 137 In their motion for declaratory judgment,
the plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance was "unreasonable" and
unconstitutional "in its entirety . . . without regard to any par-
ticular property."13 Defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies, including the right to
apply to the zoning administrator for a variance and to appeal to
the board of zoning appeals.1 39 The court held that "when the re-
lief sought constitutes a challenge to the constitutionality of a
132. Id., 375 S.E.2d at 754.
133. Id. at 208-09, 375 S.E.2d at 754-55.
134. Id. at 210, 375 S.E.2d at 755.
135. Id., 375 S.E.2d at 756.
136. Id. at 211, 375 S.E.2d at 756.
137. Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 131, 216 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1975).
138. Id. at 133, 133 n.4, 216 S.E.2d at 205, 205 n.4.
139. Id. at 132-33, 216 S.E.2d at 204-05.
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zoning ordinance in its entirety, only a variance providing total
exemption would vindicate the rights asserted."140 Such a vari-
ance was not possible under a statute providing that "all vari-
ances shall be in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of
the ordinance."141 Consequently, "there was no administrative
remedy equal to the relief sought," and the plaintiffs were enti-
tled to have their declaratory judgment action heard on the mer-
its.' Shortly after Rowe, the court again addressed the require-
ment of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of a
challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. In Gayton
Triangle Land Co. v. Board of Supervisors, the court held that
where "a landowner claims the zoning ordinance is invalid as ap-
plied to his specific property, he must exhaust adequate and
available administrative remedies before proceeding by declara-
tory judgment to make a direct judicial attack on the applied con-
stitutionality of the ordinance."
143
In Mosher Steel-Virginia v. Teig, the court faced a challenge to
a declaratory judgment based on the failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies outside the context of land use.'44 There, the
plaintiff, a steel plant operator, challenged the validity of a war-
rant for inspection of its plant that was issued to the defendant in
an ex parte proceeding.'45 The plant manager earlier refused to
permit an inspection and asserted that the warrant was illegal.'46
The defendant demurred to the plaintiffs bill for declaratory
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had an adequate rem-
edy "through review of any citation issued as a result of the in-
spection." 147 The plaintiff could only exhaust his administrative
remedies by allowing the inspection to proceed, mooting any chal-
140. Id. at 133, 216 S.E.2d at 205 (footnote call number omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gayton Triangle Land Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 216 Va. 764, 766, 222 S.E.2d 570,
572 (1976); see also Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 591-92, 318 S.E.2d 407, 412-
13 (1984) (finding that the plaintiffs in a declaratory judgment action asked the Board of
Supervisors to dismiss their application in order to exhaust administrative remedies).
144. Mosher Steel-Va. v. Teig, 229 Va. 95, 97, 327 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1985); see also Latney
v. Lukhard, 9 Va. Cir. 30, 31 (Cir. Ct. 1986) (Richmond City) (holding that an action for
declaratory judgment was proper to determine whether the Department of Social Services
adopted reasonable standards of need when the Administrative Process Act did not "condi-
tion plaintiffs access to court under the circumstances").
145. Mosher Steel-Va., 229 Va. at 97-98, 327 S.E.2d at 89-90.
146. Id. at 98, 327 S.E.2d at 90.
147. Id. at 99, 327 S.E.2d at 90.
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lenge to the constitutionality of the search. 148 Therefore, the court
held that because there was no administrative remedy equal to
the relief sought, the declaratory judgment proceeding was
proper. 149
3. Whether Agency Rules Have the Force of Law
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that "there is no ac-
tual controversy" when the plaintiff challenges an agency action
that does not have the force of law."15 In Virginia Historic Land-
marks Commission v. Board of Supervisors, the plaintiffs, land-
owners and the Board of Supervisors, filed a petition for judicial
review of the Historic Landmark Commission's resolution to
adopt the Green Springs Historic District as a registered land-
mark.' The court found that "at most the resolution of the Com-
mission does no more than encourage the county to adopt rules
and regulations which the Commission might recommend."' 2 The
resolution did not compel the Board of Supervisors to enact any
regulation or "to give the resolution any weight in its considera-
tion of zoning, rezoning, or other matters affecting the land in the
district."'53 The court was unwilling to speculate that regulations
would be adopted pursuant to the resolution in a manner that
would abridge the property rights of the landowners.' 4 The court
held that the resolution "did not give rise to a justiciable or actual
controversy" under the Act. 55
148. Id. at 100, 327 S.E.2d at 91.
149. Id. at 100-01, 327 S.E.2d at 91-92.
150. Commonwealth ex rel. Art Comm'n v. Silvette, 215 Va. 596, 598, 212 S.E.2d 261,
262-63 (1975) (holding that the plaintiff, by declaratory judgment action, could not chal-
lenge an Art Commission rule when the rule was permissive and not mandatory and
lacked the force of law).
151. Va. Historic Landmarks Comm'n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 217 Va. 468, 468-69, 230
S.E.2d 449, 449 (1976).
152. Id. at 474, 230 S.E.2d at 453.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 476, 230 S.E.2d at 454 (citing Silvette, 215 Va. at 598, 212 S.E.2d at 262-
63).
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E. The Modern Discretionary Limitations
1. Whether Rights Have Accrued and Matured and Wrongs
Suffered
If the asserted claims and rights have accrued and matured
and the alleged wrongs have been suffered by the time the de-
claratory judgment action is filed, the court will dismiss the ac-
tion." 6 In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bishop, there was a
pending wrongful death action against Bishop Jr. arising out of
an automobile accident. '57 The dealer delivered the vehicle in-
volved in the accident, a new vehicle, to the Bishops, but the cash
settlement did not occur until after the accident. 5 Bishop had
two automobile policies from Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. and Virginia Farm Bureau covering the vehicle, and the deal-
ership had a policy on the vehicle from Liberty Mutual.'59 Liberty
Mutual denied liability and refused to defend Bishop Jr. while
Hartford and Virginia Farm Bureau defended the action in-
stead. 6 ° Hartford and Virginia Farm Bureau settled the case.16'
The two companies then filed suit against Liberty Mutual for a
declaratory judgment. 6 2 The court dismissed the suit, finding:
What Hartford and Virginia Farm Bureau seek here is the recovery
of a money judgment, a sum certain, from Liberty Mutual, upon the
theory that they have defended, settled and paid under their policies
a claim which should have been defended, settled and paid by Lib-
erty Mutual under its policy. 1
63
156. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 421-22, 177 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1970).
157. Id. at 416-17, 177 S.E.2d at 521.
158. Id. at 415-16, 177 S.E.2d at 520.
159. Id. at 416, 177 S.E.2d at 520.
160. Id. at 417, 177 S.E.2d at 521.
161. Id.
162. Id.; cf. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Pac. Employer's Ins. Co., 269 Va. 399, 407,
411, 611 S.E.2d 531, 535, 537 (2005) (holding that the employer's insurer could bring a
declaratory judgment action against the employer for a declaration that the policy did not
provide coverage for liability to the employee although the insurer already contributed to
settlement of the injured party's claim; distinguishing Bishop because settlement of the
underlying claim did not occur prior to the filing of the declaratory judgment action).
163. Bishop, 211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524; Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Jeffers, 7 Va. Cir. 107, 109 (Cir. Ct. 1982) (Richmond City) (dismissing an action for de-
claratory judgment, although, there was no "[Bishop] situation because there [was] no fi-
nal decision reached as to the [underlying] claim," because the plaintiff only sought an ad-
visory opinion-"[n]othing [the defendant] has or has not done in this case has put
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Holding that the "various claims and rights asserted had all ac-
crued and matured, and that the wrongs had been suffered," the
court provided the rationale for the rule:
The intent of the declaratory judgment statutes is not to give parties
greater rights than those which they previously possessed, but to
permit the declaration of those rights before they mature. In other
words, the intent of the act is to have courts render declaratory
judgments which may guide parties in their future conduct in rela-
tion to each other, thereby relieving them from the risk of taking un-
directed action incident to their rights, which action, without direc-
tion, would jeopardize their interests. This is with a view rather to
avoid litigation than in aid of it. 164
Furthermore, "the power to make a declaratory judgment is a
discretionary one and must be exercised with care and caution"
and "will not as a rule be exercised where some other mode of
proceeding is provided."165 It is important to note that the court
expressly held open the possibility for a declaratory judgment
"'between two insurance companies as to their obligations under
the terms of their respective policies."'166
In a recent case, USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. Randolph,
the court had an opportunity to apply Bishop.167 A co-worker ac-
cidentally shot Randolph at the end of the work shift in the em-
[plaintiff] in the situation it finds itself").
164. Bishop, 211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524.
165. Id.; see also Linke v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. 128767, 1994 Va. Cir. LEXIS
902, at *6 (Cir. Ct. May 5, 1994) (Fairfax County) ("If plaintiff prevailed on her breach of
contract and bad faith claims she would be entitled to any and all damages she may have
suffered. The declaratory judgment, under these circumstances provides no additional
remedy and is indeed superfluous.").
166. Bishop, 211 Va. at 418, 177 S.E.2d at 522 (quoting Criterion Ins. Co. v. Grange
Mut. Cas. Co., 210 Va. 446, 449, 171 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1970)); cf. Atkinson v. Penske Logis-
tics, L.L.C., 61 Va. Cir. 223, 234 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Norfolk City) (holding that the case pre-
sented no justiciable controversy between the two insurance companies regarding their
obligations under the terms of their respective policies because there was no claim under
the policies).
167. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Randolph, 255 Va. 342, 497 S.E.2d 744 (1998); see also Hu-
mane Soc'y of Loudoun County, Inc. v. deButts, No. 11790, 1989 WL 646184, at *2 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 16, 1989) (Loudoun County) (holding that the plaintiffs' claims and rights had
accrued and matured; finding that plaintiffs requested only "relief ordinarily available in
such common actions or suits as, for example, to set aside a conveyance, to impose a con-
structive trust, for an accounting, for the tort of fraud or for breach of fiduciary duty"); cf
Gigante v. Target, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 141, 144 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Richmond City) (holding that
if the plaintiffs prove entitlement to future commissions, an action for breach of contract
would not fully compensate them; "[o]nly a declaration of [p]laintiffs' rights under the con-
tract can protect the parties from the costs of future litigation of a controversy which may
properly be decided in this action").
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ployee parking lot. The co-worker was transferring the rifle from
his personal car to a company owned car when it discharged. 6 '
Randolph brought a suit for declaratory judgment against multi-
ple insurance companies to determine whether his injury was
within the scope of his employment for workers' compensation
purposes.'69 The court held that "[1]ike Bishop, the present case
involves claims and rights that had accrued and matured when
the bill of complaint was filed. Thus, declaratory judgment did
not lie because other remedies were available to Randolph,
namely, a claim for workers' compensation benefits or an action
at law."17 0 Randolph illustrates that the test of whether claims
and rights have accrued and matured is a modern version of the
requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law. 171
In Blodinger v. Broker's Title, Inc., the defendants cited Bishop
in a declaratory judgment suit, asserting "that if a controversy ex-
ists it has matured past the point where [a] declaratory judgment
would lie." 172 In Blodinger, the plaintiff attorneys sought a de-
claratory judgment as to whether the defendant title company
was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law such that the
plaintiffs could not be subject to antitrust liability for their boy-
cott of the defendant.'73 The title company argued that "it was
damaged the moment the attorneys started their boycott" and
that "once damages accrue the proper remedy is an action at
law."174 The court held that unlike Bishop, "this case involves an
alleged continuing harm and mounting damages."175 The attor-
neys could not be forced to continue their boycott and subject
168. Randolph, 255 Va. at 344, 497 S.E.2d at 745.
169. Id. at 345, 497 S.E.2d at 745.
170. Id. at 347, 497 S.E.2d at 747.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 123-36; see also Stitches of Va., Inc. v. Green-
brier Mall Venture, 13 Va. Cir. 392, 392-93 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Chesapeake City) (holding
that where the petition sought a judgment as to whether certain demands for rent were
accurate determinations of the sums due, the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law,
the parties' rights and obligations had matured, and damages had already accrued).
172. Blodinger v. Broker's Title, Inc., 224 Va. 201, 204, 294 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1982); see
also Kincheloe v. Spotsylvania County, 13 Va. Cir. 133, 135 (Cir. Ct. 1988) (Spotsylvania
County) ("The fact that the plaintiffs are able to request specific performance of the re-
purchase provisions of the deed evidences the inappropriateness of a declaratory judgment
.... The claim is fully mature, the wrong has been suffered, and the issue is ripe for adju-
dication through the customary processes of the court.").
173. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94 for the court's analysis of an actual con-
troversy.
174. Blodinger, 224 Va. at 204, 294 S.E.2d at 878.
175. Id.
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themselves to possible growing antitrust liability until the com-
pany saw fit to file suit.176 Blodinger illustrates that the modern
test is subject to the same exception for continuing damages as is
the traditional requirement that there be no adequate remedy at
law. 177
2. Whether Determinative of Issues or for the Construction of
Rights
The test of whether a declaratory judgment is determinative of
issues rather than for the construction of rights appears to have
originated in Williams v. Southern Bank of Norfolk. 7 In that
case, the Southern Bank of Norfolk financed vehicles Williams
and his corporation bought and sold. 179 At one point, the bank
learned of events which led it to believe that Williams committed
a crime. 18o The bank's attorney informed the Commonwealth's At-
torney of these suspicions, and a grand jury indicted Williams on
eleven separate charges of larceny related to the financing of the
vehicles."8 ' After trial for two of the indictments resulted in an
acquittal and the remaining charges were dropped, Williams
threatened the bank with eleven actions for malicious prosecution
and sought large sums in punitive damages." 2 The bank filed a
petition for declaratory judgment against Williams alleging that
an "actual controversy existed between the parties" as to
"whether or not the [b]ank can be held civilly liable for the al-
leged malicious prosecution of [Williams]."183
The court opined that "[w]here a declaratory judgment as to a
disputed fact would be determinative of issues, rather than a con-
struction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations,
commonly expressed in written instruments, the case is not one
for declaratory judgment."" 4 The court found that the only con-
troversy was one of "disputed fact, that is, whether [the] [b]ank
made a full, correct and honest disclosure of all the material facts
176. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
178. Williams v. S. Bank of Norfolk, 203 Va. 657, 125 S.E.2d 803 (1962).




183. Id. at 658-59, 125 S.E.2d at 804.
184. Id. at 663, 125 S.E.2d at 807.
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within its knowledge" so as to be relieved of liability for malicious
prosecution. 185 The court held that "[tihe determination of that is-
sue rather than an adjudication of the rights of the parties was
the real object of the proceeding."" 6 Furthermore, "[t]he fact that
multiplicity of actions may be avoided if a declaratory judgment
be granted is not always a ground for assuming jurisdiction."8 7
Finally, the declaratory judgment would improperly allow the
"[b]ank to choose its own forum and position upon the trial of the
cause" and would "prevent the trial of each of [Williams'] prospec-
tive actions at law on its own merits by a jury."18 8
Using similar logic, the court refused to entertain a suit for de-
claratory judgment in the case of Green v. Goodman-Gable-Gould
Co.l"9 In Green, the plaintiff homeowners hired a public insurance
adjuster to help them process their fire loss claim with the insur-
ance company. 9 ° The contract provided that the insurance ad-
juster's fee would be ten percent of the gross amount adjusted or
otherwise recovered. '' The homeowners, dissatisfied with the in-
surance adjuster, requested that the adjuster withdraw.'92 The
insurance adjuster filed a motion for judgment for a declaration
that it had a ten percent interest in the insurance proceeds and
sought damages for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and con-
version.193 Prior to trial, the adjuster nonsuited all claims except
those seeking a declaratory judgment.'94 The court found that, in
the declaratory judgment proceeding, the adjuster "sought to de-
termine whether it had substantially performed its obligations
under the contract" and that the adjuster's "actual objective...
was a determination of that disputed issue rather than an adjudi-




188. Id., 125 S.E.2d at 808.
189. Green v. Goodman-Gable-Gould Co., 268 Va. 102, 110, 597 S.E.2d 77, 82 (2004);
see also Richmond v. Trigon Ins. Co., 57 Va. Cir. 276, 277 (Cir. Ct. 2002) (Norfolk City)
(holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate when the action would necessarily
require the resolution of a disputed fact and was not specifically designed merely to con-
strue specific rights under the contract).
190. Green, 268 Va. at 104, 597 S.E.2d at 78.
191. Id., 597 S.E.2d at 79.
192. Id. at 105, 597 S.E.2d at 79.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 108, 597 S.E.2d at 80-81.
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properly utilized as an "instrument[ ] of procedural fencing" be-
cause by nonsuiting the breach of contract claim the adjuster "did
not have to prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, a valid
contract, a breach of that contract by the [h]omeowners, and dam-
ages resulting from the breach."'96
In Randolph the court applied the Williams test when the
plaintiff sought a determination of whether his injury arose out of
and in the course of his employment for purposes of the workers'
compensation bar.197 The court found that "[1]ike Williams, the
present case is inappropriate for declaratory judgment because
the case does not involve a determination of rights, but only in-
volves a disputed issue to be determined in future litigation be-
tween the parties."'98 Furthermore, the entry of a declaratory
judgment would improperly allow Randolph "to choose a forum
for the determination of this issue," as was the case in Wil-
liams.'99 As Green and Randolph illustrate, the Williams test is
an important limitation on the scope of the Act because it pre-
vents plaintiffs from splitting a legal action into its various issues
for piecemeal adjudication. Under Williams, a plaintiff cannot
submit favorable issues for adjudication and exclude less favor-
able issues from litigation. 200
196. Id. at 107-08, 597 S.E.2d at 80-81.
197. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Randolph, 255 Va. 342, 347-48, 497 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1998);
see supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
198. Randolph, 255 Va. at 347, 497 S.E.2d at 747; cf. Reisen v. AETNA Life & Cas. Co.,
225 Va. 327, 335-37, 302 S.E.2d 529, 533-34 (1983) (holding that a declaratory judgment
was proper, despite a pending tort action, to decide the issue of whether coverage existed
when the plaintiff owed a duty to settle with the defendant within policy limits, but only if
coverage existed; finding that the "conclusion is not altered by the circumstance that the
ultimate issue of fact determining coverage was one of the issues scheduled for adjudica-
tion in the tort action" because "in the present case, unlike Williams, declaratory judg-
ment as to the disputed fact in issue resulted ... in delineation and interpretation of defi-
nite rights expressed in the insurance contract"); Nottingham v. Caviggiola, 67 Va. Cir. 86,
90 (Cir. Ct. 2005) (Norfolk City) (holding that the plaintiff could ask the court "to interpret
various insurance policies so that [the] parties can be guided in their future conduct in re-
lation to each other and avoid the risk of action that would jeopardize their respective in-
terests").
199. Randolph, 255 Va. at 347-48, 497 S.E.2d at 747.
200. See Williams v. S. Bank of Norfolk, 203 Va. 657, 662-63, 125 S.E.2d 803, 807-08
(1962).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The bill quia timet allowed a plaintiff, apprehensive of possible
or probable future damage, to bring suit against a negligent, cul-
pable, or otherwise liable defendant. However, the scope of the
bill quia timet was limited by its historical uses and the best Vir-
ginia definition of the bill referenced those uses.2°1 In Virginia,
the bill quia timet was used primarily by sureties apprehensive of
loss from the failure of creditors to enforce rights against princi-
pal debtors and by landowners to remove cloud on title. The De-
claratory Judgments Act is rooted in the principle of quia timet
because the Act authorizes the court to adjudicate the rights of
the parties before they are violated. However, the utility of the
Act is not limited to its historical uses but rather by the constitu-
tional restriction of actual controversy and the court's sound dis-
cretion.
The actual controversy requirement contemplates an actual
antagonistic assertion and denial of right by the parties to a de-
claratory judgment action. The plaintiff cannot seek an advisory
opinion or the determination of a hypothetical question; the ad-
verse claims must be based on present rather than future or
speculative facts. The parties must have a sufficient interest,
known as a justiciable interest or sometimes as a real interest, in
the outcome of the litigation. While the court may separately ana-
lyze whether the plaintiff has a justiciable interest in the outcome
of the litigation and whether the plaintiff alleged an actual con-
troversy, such a separate inquiry is unnecessary and may only
lead to confusion. However, in land use cases, the justiciable in-
terest test may be used as a shortcut in the determination of
whether the plaintiff alleged an actual controversy. Regardless of
whether the court applies the actual controversy test or the more
specific justiciable interest requirement, the inquiry must remain
a preliminary one, separate and distinct from a decision on the
merits. Whether the case presents an actual controversy is a
question of fact for the court to determine based on the allega-
tions in the pleadings and evidence.
In their sound discretion, the courts of Virginia have required
something more than an actual controversy. Traditionally, the
201. See Randolph v. Kinney, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 394, 397-98 (1825); see also supra text
accompanying note 5 for the definition.
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courts have required that no adequate remedy at law be available
to the plaintiff. Prior to seeking a declaratory judgment, the
plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies. The court will
not grant a declaratory judgment challenging agency rules which
do not have the force of law. In addition to these traditional limi-
tations, the courts have fashioned a rule that the plaintiff cannot
seek a declaratory judgment with respect to claims and rights
that have accrued and matured and wrongs that have been suf-
fered. The rule is a reflection of the purpose of the Declaratory
Judgments Act-to guide the parties in their future relation to
one another. The rule is similar to the traditional requirement
that there be no adequate remedy at law, but the rule more prop-
erly focuses on the Act's purpose. Like the traditional constraint,
the rule does not apply to cases where the plaintiff alleged con-
tinuing harm and mounting damages. Another modern rule is
that the court will not entertain an action seeking a declaration
determinative of issues rather than for the construction of defi-
nite rights, status, or other relationships of the parties. This rule
prevents plaintiffs from splitting an action into favorable issues
for litigation and excluding less favorable issues. In other words,
the rule thwarts improper procedural fencing.
Whether a given case falls within the scope of the Virginia De-
claratory Judgments Act is dependent on the flexible concept of
actual controversy. While the requirement of actual controversy
is a constitutional limitation on the right to bring a suit for de-
claratory judgment, the courts in their sound discretion have
strived to strike a balance between furthering the Act's purpose of
making the courts more serviceable to the people and exercising
judicial constraint where an adjudication would not touch the
rights of the parties, would affect claims and rights that have ma-
tured and address wrongs that have been suffered, or would be
determinative of issues rather than for the construction of rights.
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